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CHAPTER 1 
§(())vereignty, Territoria ity, aJl1ld the JEJl1lfoTfcement 
(())f F(())reigJIJljudgment§ 
George Rutherglen and james Y. Stem 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the effect of state boundaries as 
hard-and-fast limits on judicial and legislative jurisdiction steadily eroded. 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington1 stands as a landmark precedent, replac-
ing traditional requirements that the defendant or the defendant's property be 
present in the forum state at the outset of litigation with a regime requiring 
only that the defendant have certain 11minimum contacts" with the forum.2 
That case, concerned with personal jurisdiction over a corporation, was con-
sistent with similar transformations elsewhere: personal jurisdiction over 
natural persons,3 choice oflaw,4 and extraterritorial application of forum stat-
utory law. 5 Altogether, these developments are part of a wider revolution in 
jurisdictional practices, which began before World War II with Legal Realism 
and continued into the last decades of the twentieth century. 
* George Rutherglen is the John Barbee Minor Distinguished Professor of Law and Earl 
K. Shawe Professor of Employment Law at the University of Virginia. James Y. Stern is an 
Assistant Professor at the William & Mary Law School. 
1 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (state can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant which 
has "certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"). 
2 Id. at 316. 
3 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (nonresident of Delaware did not have the neces-
sary ''minimum contacts" merely by holding stock in a Delaware company unrelated to the 
litigation because ''all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to 
the standards set forth in International Shoe"). 
4 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (permitting a state to apply its own 
law to resolve a dispute so long as the has "a significant contact or significant aggregation of 
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair."); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y. 2d at 481, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963) (New York law 
applied based on the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" approach); see generally 
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE (2006). 
5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 445-447 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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To be sure, this revolution produced its own reactionary impulses, reflected 
in efforts to salvage various traditional rules confining sovereign power 
to national borders and to impose qualifications upon the broadly stated 
standards set out in opinions like International Shoe. In widely noted deci-
sions, for example, the Supreme Court upheld personal jurisdiction based on 
presence of the defendant within the forum state6 and recognized a strong 
presumption against extra-territorial application of American law. 7 Yet the 
reaction has remained essentially defensive, limiting the expansion of juris-
diction rather than forcing it back. These recent decisions do not question the 
vitality of International Shoe, but instead confine themselves to working out its 
implications. 8 
It may therefore come as something of a shock to discover that strict ter-
ritorial limits on sovereign power have never been abandoned-in fact, never 
seem to have been questioned-as an absolute prerequisite for enforcement 
of judgments. Enforcement of a judgment, and especially a foreign judgment, 
does not become possible until the defendant or the defendant's property can 
be found within the enforcing forum at the onset of enforcement proc~ed­
ings. The original adjudicating court (conventionally designated Fl) might be 
able to invoke liberal and flexible concepts of judicial and legislative jurisdic-
tion and so reach a wider range of matters than would have traditionally been 
possible, but the enforcing court (F2) cannot. Put differently, Fl cannot also 
serve as F2 unless it meets standards of presence and territoriality. Presence of 
the defendant or the defendant's property within F2 remains a prerequisite for 
enforcement of judgments there. Despite a century of erosion and decay in Fl, 
the strict territorial theory remains alive and well in F2. 
Explanations for this discrepancy nevertheless appear to be readily at 
hand. Enforcement of a judgment against property, or against the person of 
6 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (finding personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident who was personally served with process while temporarily in the state, even if his 
presence was unrelated to the litigation). 
7 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.1659, 1664 (2013) (presumption against extra-
territorial application provides that" [ w ]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extrater-
ritorial application, it has none"). 
8 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856-2857 (2011) ( defen-
dant did not have "continuous and systematic general business contacts" necessary to sup-
port personal jurisdiction with respect to claim that neither arose out of nor related to the 
defendant's activities"); J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) 
(opinion of Kennedy,].) (defendant did not "purposefully avai[l] itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State" even though it might have predicted that its goods 
would reach there). 
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the defendant, presupposes something or someone within the jurisdiction 
that can be seized in order to satisfy the judgment. And only the officers of F2 
ordinarily have the authority, or the effective power, to act within the territo-
rial confines of the state, especially in the face of resistance or evasion by the 
defendant. The officers of Fl have no such power and any attempt to grant it 
to them in F2 requires the latter's consent, seldom forthcoming except on the 
most ad hoc basis. The sovereign independence of separate states, and the ter-
ritorial allocation of power between them, dictates the exclusive control of F2 
over the enforcement of judgments within its territory. 
The only disquieting note in this seemingly ineluctable reasoning comes 
from its disturbing similarity to the rationale in the venerable decision in 
Pennoyer v. Neff,9 which represents the classic statement of the strict territo-
rial theory of personal jurisdiction that governed before International Shoe. 
From the perspective of today's jurisdictional practices, Pennoyer seems to be 
mistaken only in transposing the strict requirements of territorial presence 
from issues of execution at the end of the lawsuit to those of personal jurisdic-
tion at the beginning. As Chief Justice Stone pointed out in International Shoe, 
the jurisdiction of courts was historically ((grounded on their de facto power 
over the defendant's person .... But now that the capias ad respondendum has 
given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process 
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if 
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of suit does not offend 'traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'10 Arresting the defendant or seiz-
ing the defendant's property can await the conclusion of the lawsuit, and if 
necessary, enforcement proceedings in F2; these steps are not necessary at the 
outset to obtain personal jurisdiction in Fl. 
Yet the persistence of the strict territorial theory at the remedial stage of 
litigation demonstrates just how robust it is. The deeply embedded nature 
of territorial limits on jurisdiction is reflected not only in the nature of execu-
tion itself, which perforce must be carried out within the territory of a state 
where the object or means of execution is located, but in the processes lead-
ing up to it. In particular, a foreign judgment has to be ((domesticated" before 
g 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877) ("Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-
residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and 
appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its 
citizens."). 
10 326 U.S. at 316. The common law writ of capias ad respondendum authorized the sheriff 
to capture the defendant and bring him to court. 
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execution can take place. Absent a treaty or legislation that binds F2, a suc-
cessful plaintiff in Fl cannot just take the resulting judgment from Fl into F2 
for enforcement. The plaintiff must, instead, commence a separate lawsuit in 
F2's courts, which then determines the authenticity and the consequences of 
the judgment from Fl.11 It is the judgment resulting from such a proceeding in 
F2 that will then be enforced. This system could have d~amatic consequences, 
potentially transforming enforcement into the tail of litigation, so to speak, 
that wags the dog of jurisdiction. If enforcement requires judicial proceedings 
in a state wh.ere the defendant or the defendant's property is situated, then 
the expansion of adjudicative jurisdiction authorized by International Shoe 
amounts to practically nothing-unless the enforcing state either chooses to 
or is compelled to treat the adjudicating state's judgment as conclusive. 
Nowhere is the survival of territoriality more apparent than with respect 
to judgments from foreign nations, where both sovereignty and territoriality 
matter far more than in purely domestic cases. This chapter explores the differ-
ences between domestic and foreign judgments in three sections. Section 1 dis-
tinguishes the special rules applicable to recognition of judgments from sister 
states from those applicable to judgments of foreign states. As states within a 
strong federal union defined by the Constitution, sister states are bound by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.12 This clause, and supporting legislation, have been 
interpreted to require F2 to give Fl judgments the preclusive effect Fl would give 
them, almost without exception. This exacting rule of recognition has direct 
practical implications f?r the invocation of flexible standards of personal juris-
diction in Fl. It makes those standards in Fl nearly always dispositive in F2, and 
it correspondingly diminishes the force of the strict territorial theory applied in 
F2 to enforcement of judgments of Fl. If F2 is bound by an Fl judgment, includ-
ing Fl's determination of the propriety of its own jurisdiction, F2's restrictions 
on jurisdiction to enforce judgments make little practical difference. The plain-
tiff can always go to Fl, invoke the flexible territorial theory there, and then 
take the resulting judgment to F2 where the defendant's property is located. 
Here the dog wags the tail. 
11 States may enact statutes allowing foreign judgments to take effect upon registration, 
rather than a full-blown suit on the judgment, but even these statutes still require some 
form of domestication and they are in any event for the enacting state to adopt, or not, as 
it sees fit. An example of such expedited procedure for enforcement is the Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, discussed in the text accompanying notes 51-52 
infra. 
12 U.S. Const. art. IV; § 1; "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general 
laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, 
and the effect thereof." 
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Section 2 reviews the standard exceptions for recognition of foreign inter-
national judgments and how they open the door to the invocation of F2's 
sovereign power based on its territorial control over the defendant and the 
defendant's property. The exclusive control that F2 exercises over enforcement 
within its boundaries gives its courts the power to engage in review of the judg-
ments of Fl. This implication follows from the principle, given its canonical 
statement by Justice Story, that ((whatever force and obligation the laws of one 
country have in another depends solely upon the laws, and municipal regula-
tions of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence and pol-
ity and upon its own express or tacit consent."13 Even though recognition of 
foreign judgments is the rule rather than the exception, it is a considerably 
weaker rule than that applicable between sister states. It gives F2 the opportu-
nity to re-examine the process and the policy underlying the judgment of Fl 
for consistency with the principles embodied in the law of F2. 
Section 3 then offers a justification for this regime of limited recognition 
of foreign judgments derived from the external effects, both detrimental and 
beneficial, that result from the judgment of Fl. In a world without strong rules 
of international law regulating judicial proceedings, independent sovereigns 
have strong reasons to re-examine the balance between the costs and benefits 
of enforcing foreign judgments as they have effects within their own territory. 
Sovereignty and territoriality determine the need for exceptions to the recog-
nition of foreign judgments, even if they do not determine their precise form 
and content. Indeed, the exceptions need not have precise form and content 
and may better serve their purpose by generally deterring overenforcement of 
foreign judgments by an indefinite threat of nonrecognition. 
1 Interstate Versus XntemationaJI. Recognition of Judgments 
Despite some similarities, recognition of sister-state judgments looks very dif-
ferent from the enforcement of foreign-country judgments, particularly in the 
narrow range of exceptions that allow nonrecognition. By longstanding inter-
pretation, the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a nearly absolute rule of 
interstate recognition of judgments. The leading case is Fauntleroy v. Lum,l4 in 
13 Joseph Story; Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: Foreign and Domestic, in REGARD TO 
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MAR.ru.AGES, 
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND jUDGMENTS § 23 at 24 (1st ed.l834).) 
14 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (Missouri judgment entitled to full faith and credit ((as the jurisdiction 
of the Missouri court is not open to dispute the judgment cannot be impeached in 
Mississippi even if it went upon a misapprehension of the Mississippi law"). 
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which the Supreme Court required Mississippi to enforce a Missouri judgment 
over the objection that the judgment itself was unconstitutional: that Missouri 
had failed to apply Mississippi law to the underlying transaction, in violation 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Mississippi's position had considerable 
force: the dispute that led to the judgment was for gambling debts incurred 
in Mississippi in violation of Mississippi law. The Court, however, rejected 
Mississippi's attempt to go behind the judgment. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Holmes reasoned that the original judgment 11Cannot be impeached 
either in or out of the State by showing that it was based upon a mistake of 
law."15 To paraphrase another of his opinions, 11th ere sometimes has been an 
air of benevolent gratuity" in the enforcement of judgments from other states, 
but 110f course there is no gratuity about it."16 F2 must treat the judgment of Fl 
just as Fl would. 
A few exceptions to this Full Faith and Credit rule stand out, but the nar-
row terms in which they are cast just prove how strong the rule is. There are 
the limits on enforcement of judgments concerning penal, tax, and property 
issues. Collateral attack for lack of personal jurisdiction allows a defendant to 
avoid the effect of a default judgment.17 Yet that exception-which, as it hap-
pens, comes from Pennoyer v. Ne./f8-depends upon the defendant's failure to 
appear in Fl. A defendant cannot just attack a judgment for misapplication of 
International Shoe. Another flash point for recognition of judgments has to do 
with marriage, divorce, and child custody, where a complicated system of rules 
has broadened personal jurisdiction to determine marital status but limited 
the effects of such judgments with respect to related issues, such as property 
settlements, support payments, and child custody.19 ~he current controversy 
over recognition of same-sex marriage, legitimated in one state but challenged 
in another, is only the most recent example of the special rules for full faith 
and credit in domestic relations and "status" cases. Legislation under the Full 
. 15 Id. at 237. 
16 Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220 (1917) (Holmes,]., dissenting) 
(arguing that admiralty courts should apply state law to tort claims arising on navigable 
waters). 
17 In some circumstances, a judgment can also be attacked based on a lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940). For the exception for penal, tax, 
and property judgments, see notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text. 
18 95 U.S. at 728-729. 
19 E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,297 (1942) (marital status can be determined 
by a forum that is the marital domicile of one of the parties); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 
U.S. 416, 420 (1957) (wife's right to support cannot be determined without personal 
jurisdiction over her). 
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Faith and Credit Clause has solved many of these problems (as in litigation 
over child custody),20 and it has raised constitutional questions in others (as in 
the litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act). 21 
Whatever the scope of these exceptions, they pale beside the dominant rule 
of respect for and enforcement of the judgments of sister states articulated 
in Fauntleroy. Like several other provisions in Article rv, the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause was designed 11to form a more perfect Union" of the states, 22 in 
the particular sense of strengthening their bonds beyond those among foreign 
nations.23 As it has been interpreted, this clause supplies a binding rule of law 
superior to any rule derived solely from state law, with no analogue in the inter-
national context, and that rule is a broad one.24 To the very considerable extent 
Fl's judgment must be given preclusive effect in F2, it is Fl's adjudication that 
20 See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738A (2012) (requiring interstate 
recognition of custody and visitation determinations). 
21 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) ("No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons 
of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.") Other provisions 
of the act limited the meaning of "marriage" in federal law to marriage between a man 
and a woman and were declared unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
22 U.S. Const. preamble. 
2 3 Recent scholarship would.limit the binding effect of the clause to matters of authentication, 
rather than recognition (and the preclusive effect), of sister-state judgments. See Ann 
Woolhandler & Michael Collins,]urisdictionalDiscrimination and FulL Faith and Credit, 63 
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1029 nn. l6,_17 (2014); Stephen E. Sachs, FulL Faith and Credit in the Early 
Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1206-07 (2009). Yet this revisionist interpretation only calls 
attention to the difference between interstate and international judgment recognition, 
which was appreciated as early as Justice Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. 
See Story, supra note 13, § 609 at 509. On the prevailing interpretation, the two situations 
are treated as entirely different because the Constitution deprives F2 of the freedom to 
decide how much effect, if any, to give to the judgment of Fl. Even on the revisionist 
interpretation, moreover, F2 has a far more limited power to inquire into the authenticity 
of Fl judgments from other U.S. states compared with those from other nations. And its 
ability to deny recognition to sister-state judgments is in any event subject to whatever 
restrictions are imposed from above by Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
and perhaps by federal common law as well. 
24 28 U.S. C.§ 1738 (2012) e·such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so 
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United 
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of 
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."). 
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is decisive. Regardless of where the defendant or the defendant's property is 
situated, Fl's adjudication will carry the day, as long as Fl can satisfy the mini-
mal requirements of International Shoe. 
In the international setting, by contrast, enforcing states enjoy significantly 
more flexibility and discretion. This latitude is usually described in terms of 
licomity," which was given its classic formulation in Hilton v. Guyot,25 a decision 
that refused recognition of a French judgment. The Court defined comity in 
the following terms: 
ucomity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it 
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the leg-
islative, executive C?r judicial acts of another nation, having due regard 
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.26 
Comity reserves to each nation the discretion to recognize judgments from 
another nation. Even if those judgments typically are enforced, they need 
not be. No source of law superior to F2 requires it to recognize the judgments 
of Fl. F2 might subject itself to such requirements and dispense with the 
rule of comity, for instance, by acceding to a treaty on recognition of foreign 
judgments. A treaty brings the international situation closer to the inter-
state model.27 Even then, the possibility of unilateral abrogation of the treaty 
remains, as does the role of the courts in the enforcing state as the final arbiter 
of the effect of a foreign judgment, typically without review by any other tri-
bunal. In the absence of a treaty, comity serves as a residual source of power 
in F2 to reexamine the judgments of Fl. Even if those judgments typically are 
enforced by F2, they need not be. 
The difference between interstate and international recognition of judg-
ments has immediate consequences for the effect of Fl's own standards for 
exercising jurisdiction. In the interstate situation, so long as Fl exercises juris-
diction within wide constitutional boundaries, it does not matter where in the 
United States a prevailing party seeks to enforce the resulting judgment. Fl's 
finding of personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction, not to say its 
25 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
26 I d. at 164. 
27 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements [official compilation]; Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards [official compilation]. 
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decision on the merits, must itself be given ~~full faith and credit" by F2.28 Any 
money judgment can be enforced in any state in which the judgment debtor's 
property can be found. It does not matter that the enforcement action in F2 
remains subject to the strict territorial restraints of Pennoyerv. Neff.29 The gen-
erous and open-ended standards of International Shoe determine the jurisdic-
tion of Fl, 30 and with it, the enforceability of Fl's judgment. 
No such simple consequences, however, follow from issuance of a foreign 
judgment or from a foreign court's determination that it has jurisdiction. F2 
can re-examine these determinations, indirectly giving effect to the territorial 
limits on enforcement of judgments as a restraint on Fl's exercise of jurisdic-
tion. The current version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act (UF-CMJRA) makes such re-examination central to recogni- · 
tion of foreign judgments. 31 Section 5 of the Act identifies several situations in 
which F2 must accept the personal jurisdiction of Fl, but Fl's conclusion that 
its exercise of jurisdiction was proper is conspicuously absent from the list. 32 
There is no bar to relitigating the question of personal jurisdiction, even if Fl 
and F2 apply the same standards to assess personaljurisdiction.33 Nor is F2's 
ability to review Fl's judgment limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction. 
F2 can go further and re-examine other procedural and jurisdictional issues 
raised in Fl and, to a considerable extent, the substance of Fl's judgment. 34 All 
of these grounds for nonrecognition create further doubt and uncertainty over 
the plaintiff's initial choice ofFl as a court with jurisdiction over the defendant. 
z8 Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963) (judgment must be given full faith and credit on 
issue of subject-matter jurisdiction if it was fully and fairly litigated and finally decided by 
the court that rendered the original judgment); Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's 
Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522,526 (1931) (same for issue of personal jurisdiction). 
29 95 U.S. at 720. ("The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial 
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond 
those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an 
illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse."). 
30 326 U.S. at 317 (observing that uthe terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to 
symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will 
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process"). 
31 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act of 2005 § 4(b)(2), (3). 
The earlier version of the Act contained nearly identical provisions. Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 § 4. 
32 UF-CMJRA § 5. 
33 Agnitsch v. Process Specialists, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 812, 821 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (re-examining 
foreign judgment to determine if F1 had personal jurisdiction under F2's five-factor test 
for minimum contacts). 
34 Id. § 4(b)(1), (c). 
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The holder of a judgment from a foreign nation stands in what appears to be a 
significantly weaker position than the holder of a judgment from a sister state. 
2 The Distinctive Features of Foreig:nJudgments 
The difference between the enforcement of domestic and foreign judgments 
are, at the same time, fundamental and elusive-fundamental because they 
reflect enduring limits on national sovereignty, but elusive because American 
law follows a presumption in favor of recognition of foreign judgments. The 
formal difference between full faith and credit as a constitutional require-
ment and the exercise of discretion as a matter of comity goes back to the 
seminal decision in Hilton v. Guyot35 and is carried forward in modern stat-
utes, like the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act 
(UF-CMJRA).36 The presumption in favor of recognition of foreign judgments 
can be overcome when a case falls within any of several exceptions, most of 
them inapplicable to interstate judgments under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. 37 Yet these exceptions make a difference only in comparatively few 
cases, which raises the question why they should be retained at all. Why not 
treat international cases just like interstate cases? A look at the nature of the 
exceptions-theoretically broad, if practically limited-provides an answer to 
this question. 
_The most prominent exception is for judgments inconsistent with the 
enforcing forum's public policy. That exception can become a serious irritant 
in relations with foreign countries, as illustrated in the United States by the 
SPEECH Act of 2010,38 which forbids enforcement of defamation judgments 
from nations, notoriously, the United Kingdom, which view rights to freedom 
of speech more narrowly than American law. Yet for all their intensity, the 
35 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-164 (1895) (French judgment not recognized because 
France did not grant reciprocal recognition to American judgments) '"Comity,' in the legal 
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy 
and good will, upon the other." Unless provided for by a treaty "there is no obligation, 
recognized by legislators, public authorities, and publicists, to regard foreign laws; but 
their application is admitted only from considerations of utility and the mutual 
convenience of States ... . "I d. at 214. 
36 See UF-CMJRA § 4( c )(3) ("a court of this state need not recognize a foreign-country judg-
ment if the foreign-country judgment or the [claim] on which the foreign-country 
judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States."). 
3 7 See supra note 14. 
38 28 u.s.c. §§ 4101-05. 
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occasions for invoking the public policy exception are surprisingly narrow. 39 
Differences in public policy have to rise to the level of severe inconsistency to 
trigger this exception. It stands less as a regularly invoked exception and more 
for the general vulnerability of foreign judgments to re-examination under the 
discretionary regime of comity. 
The discretion evident in the public policy exception reappears in the vari-
ety and open texture of the other exceptions to recognition, which generate 
more litigation. Lack of personal jurisdiction in Fl is prominent among them, 
and it blends imperceptibly into general procedural concerns, most accommo-
dated comfortably under the general heading of udue process." So, for instance, 
American courts tend to re-examine the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a 
foreign court-even if, in the end, they seldom refuse recognition of a foreign 
judgment on this ground, typically finding sufficient contacts for jurisdiction 
under a combination of foreign, domestic, and internationallaw.40 
A quick survey of the UF-CMJRA reveals the range and flexibility of the 
other exceptions to recognition, which constitute standards rather than rules, 
and which empower as much as they circumscribe judicial discretion. Almost 
all the remaining exceptions concern issues of procedure: denial of due pro-
cess, lack of personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction, inadequate 
notice, fraud in obtaining the judgment, inconsistency with another final judg-
ment, failure to adhere to a forum selection clause, or forum non conveniens.41 
The Uniform Act departs from these general categories of nonrecognition, all 
of which depend heavily upon prior judicial decisions, only in specifying sev-
eral grounds sufficient for finding personal jurisdiction. These, too, however, 
have their source in judicial decisions recognizing presence or consent as a 
basis for personal jurisdiction.42 In effect, as well as in form, these provisions 
operate more as a restatement of existing law rather than as a freestanding 
statutory innovation. To the extent they make changes, these are variations 
39 RONALD A. BRAND, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 21 (Federal 
Judicial Center) (2012) (courts "seldom deny" recognition of judgments on this ground); 
see Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,111 (1918) (courts refuse to recognize claims 
based on law of another jurisdiction only when 11help would violate some fundamental 
principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted 
tradition of the common weal"). 
40 See, e.g., Evans Cabinet Corp. v. Kitchen Int'l, Inc., 593 F.3d 135, 141-48 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(applying Massachusetts version of UF-CMJRA and both foreign law and Massachusetts 
law of personal jurisdiction). 
41 See UF-CMJRA § 4( a) (mandatory grounds for nonrecognition); id. § 4(b) (discretionary 
grounds for nonrecognition). 
42 !d. at § 5( a). 
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on themes already sounded in judicial decisions. The same can be said of the 
federal statute proposed by the American Law Institute.43 The ALI statute, for 
instance, differs from the uniform act in reinstating the requirement of reci-
procity first articulated in American law in Hilton v. Guyot44 and in requiring 
more than the defendant's transitory presence within the forum as a basis for 
personal jurisdiction, 45 thus going beyond what is required under Burnham v. 
Superior Court. 46 
Both the legislation and the case law defy efforts at simple summary or 
analysis, since several different grounds are specified that either require non-
recognition, permit nonrecognition, or are insufficient for either. Sections 4( a), 
4(b ), and 5( a) of the UF-CMJRA deal respectively with each of these issues, 
by subdividing them into more specific grounds for recognition or nonrecog-
nition. The rationale for all these separate provisions is best captured in one 
subdivision of the ALI's proposed statute: it states that a judgment cannot be 
recognized if it ((was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial and justi-
fiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with respect to the judg-
ment in question."47 This provision serves as a kind of catch-all and reflects the 
overall degree of suspicion that must attach to a foreign judgment to prevent 
it from being recognized. When Fl is foreign, F2 has considerable discretion to 
deny recognition and enforcement of Fl's judgment, even if it seldom does so. 
There are some ways in which F2's power of re-examination might be 
avoided. Fl might issue an injunction concerning a defendant's behavior in 
F2, but its enforceability will depend on the defendant at some point being 
present in Fl; sanctions for contempt invariably are issued only by Fl and 
can take effect only within its boundaries.48 The academic literature offers a 
theory that supplies another possible means to circumvent F2's discretion to 
deny recognition. In this view, a judgment creditor can work around states that 
are more reluctant to recognize foreign judgments by going to states that are 
less reluctant, and then taking the resulting state judgment and arguing that 
it is entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution and under the state 
43 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN jUDGMENTS: 
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE§ 7(a) (2005) (ALI Proposal). 
44 See supra note 26. 
45 ALI Proposal § 6( a)(iv). 
46 See supra note 6. 
47 ALI Proposal§ 4(a)(ii). 
48 Bakerv. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,238-40 (1998). 
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and federal laws facilitating recognition of judgments from other states.49 In 
schematic terms, Fl is a foreign nation; its judgment is taken to F2, a state that 
liberally recognizes foreign judgments; and then F2's judgment is taken to F3, a 
state that has a more restrictive policy but is bound by the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Only the step from Fl to F2 requires resort to the UF-CMJRA (or in states 
without the model statute, to related common law doctrines). The step from F2 
to F3 can rely on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and implementing statutes. 
This argument depends upon the crucial assumption that the applicable 
law allows this form of 'Judgment-laundering," not just as a matter of theory 
but as a matter of practice. At the federal level, so the argument goes, a stat-
ute restates and extends the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 5° 
and a related statute provides for registration of federal judgments from any 
federal district in any other, 51 enabling a prevailing plaintiff in federal court to 
obtain a form of nationwide enforcement. At the state level, another uniform 
act, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), 52 provides 
for expedited enforcement of judgments from one state in another state. In 
theory, these statutes support the step from F2-a federal or state court that 
recognizes a genuinely foreign judgment-to F3 for enforcement-in another 
federal district or another state. As a matter of full faith and credit, F3 must 
recognize the judgment from F2 despite the origins of that judgment in the 
foreign country of Fl. 
This is a formally valid line of reasoning, and it has been widely recom-
mended as a tactic for enforcing judgment from other nations. 53 Yet this prac-
tice has few reported decisions to support it, and the same hesitation that 
attaches to recognition of a foreign judgment in F2 would also attach to recog-
nition in F3. Much more common has been the resort to the federal registra-
tion statute or the UEFJA to provide procedures for authenticating judgments 
from foreign nations and specifying the means, once recognized, by which 
they might be enforced, either in F2 or F3. 54 Wholesale departures from the 
49 Gregory H. Shill, Ending judgment Arbitrage: jurisdictional Competition and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Money judgments in the United States, 54 HARv. INT'L L.J. 459, 470 
& n. 43 (2013); John P. Bellinger, III, Recognition of Foreign Judgments: Balancing 
International, Federal, State, ~nd Commercial Interests at 6 (2012).) 
so 28 u.sc. § 1738 (2006). 
51 Id. § 1963. 
52 13 U.L.A. 261 (1981). Notwithstanding its name, this act applies only to sister-state 
judgments, which are "foreign" only in the sense that they come from another state. It has 
no application as an initial matter to foreign judgments. 
53 Shill, supra note 49, at 470. 
54 Brand, supra note 39, at 5 & n. 19. 
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traditional exceptions to recognition of judgments from foreign nations have 
yet to be thoroughly documented. 
A third way in which the territorial restrictions on enforcement might be 
skirted is to avoid going after the defendant's person or property. It is possi-
ble for recognition of a judgment, as opposed to enforcement, to be sought 
without any prospect of enforcement (assuming F2 satisfies the requirements 
of personal jurisdiction). A defendant, for instance, could seek recognition of 
a judgment in F2, in order to bar further litigation after prevailing on the 
merits in Fl. But the usefulness of such proceedings is very limited. Sooner 
or later, collecting on a judgment requires property which can be seized and 
sold in satisfaction of the judgment. Only the officers of the state where the 
property is located have this authority. There is one reported case, from New 
York, allowing an enforcement action in anticipation of the defendant bring-
ing property into the state, but its reasoning still depends upon presence of 
property within the state, albeit at a future point in time. 55 If the property were 
never to arrive, the New York judgment would be of little use. The opportu-
nity for plaintiffs to engage in foreign shopping for purposes of enforcement 
remains circumscribed by the location of the ·defendant's assets. Unlike judg-
ments from another state, those from a foreign nation do not automatically 
receive faith and credit to gain enforcement wherever the defendant's property 
might be found. They must both satisfy the requirement that the defendant's 
property be present and avoid coming within any exception to enforcement 
provided by local law. 
The real question is not whether F2's role in the enforcement process can 
somehow be evaded, but just what the effects of the exceptions to recognition 
in F2 are. How high are the hurdles that they pose to enforcement of foreign 
judgments? The answer appears to be, not prohibitively, so that most plain-
tiffs can take precautions to assure enforcement of a foreign judgment in the 
United States. 56 The plaintiff has to exercise some care in choosing Fl to make 
sure that its judgments regularly are recognized in F2; that the grounds for per-
sonal and subject-matter jurisdiction are not too exorbitant, that the relevant 
public policies of Fl and F2 are not completely at odds; and in general, that 
F2 can trust the reliability of the judgment of Fl. The plaintiff must still bear 
the costs resulting from the uncertainty of enforcement and from complicat-
ing a collection action into a form of international civil litigation. No matter 
55 Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., Inc., 281 A.D.2d 42, 50, 723 N.Y.S.2d 285, 291 (4th Dep't 2001). 
56 Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge for the ALL· Herein of 
Foreign Country judgments, an International Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 
635, 638-397 (2000). 
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how liberal the attitude that F2 takes towards recognition of judgments from 
other nations, it can still insist on re-examining the substance and procedure 
of the judgment from Fl. Countries concede the power to give unexamined 
effect to a foreign judgment only by way of treaty or by joining a federal union. 
The case-by-case review of foreign judgments encouraged by the concept of 
comity allows them to preserve the sovereign power that otherwise might be 
ceded to the courts of another country. 
Ohno v. Yasuma, 57 a recent decision, is representative in terms of both pro-
cess and result. The case concerned a plaintiff who brought an action in Japan 
against a church, alleging that it defrauded her of assets worth half a million 
dollars. The Japanese court issued a judgment in her favor, which she then 
sought to enforce in federal court in California. Because federal jurisdiction 
was based on diversity of citizenship, the court applied the California version 
of the UF -CMJRA. The defendants argued against recognition on grounds of 
public policy and because the judgment violated the Free Exercise Clause. The 
court rejected both arguments, but only after a close comparison of Japanese 
law with California law and the requirements of the First Amendment. Neither 
of these grounds for challenging the judgment would have been available if the 
judgment had come from a sister state. 
The costs of re-examination vary with the location of the defendant's assets, 
since. that determines which nation or which state can serve as a forum for 
enforcement. Within the United States, state law determines the enforceabil-
ity of judgments from other countries in the absence of a treaty or a federal 
statute. 58 The presence of the judgment debtor's property within a state's ter-
ritory remains an unquestioned prerequisite to enforcement in F2, and for 
that reason, it determines which state's law supplies the exceptions to the pre-
sumption in favor of enforcing Fl's judgment. State boundaries therefore set 
definite limits that, in turn, set upper and lower bounds to the indefinite costs 
of uncertainty and complexity borne by the plaintiff. Other definite restric-
tions on enforcement also come into play. Only money judgments, and only 
those that do not involve penal or tax claims, are entitled to recognition. These 
restrictions, too, determine the plaintiff's strategy in framing the underlying 
claims in Fl. 
These barriers are not insignificant, but they are less than overwhelming for 
litigants in the mine run of cases. The prevailing regime for the enforcement 
57 723 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2013). 
58 Another possible exception concerns the existence of a federal claim in F2, which would 
rarely be made in an action solely to enforce a foreign judgment. See · RussELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 746-47 (5th ed. 2006). 
28 RUTHERGLEN AND STERN 
of foreign judgments is nuanced and its effects must, it seems, be subtle. The 
question that remains, then, is just what role territorial restrictions play in 
the judgment enforcement context and whether that role can be justified. 
3 l'he System of l'enitorial Sovereignty 
In this section, we seek to uncover the theoretical underpinnings of the 
approach to enforcement of judgments followed in both domestic and interna-
tional cases. This approach is founded, we believe, on widely shared concepts 
of territorial sovereignty, deeply embedded in the conception of the modern 
nation state as the ultimate arbiter of the use of force within its boundaries. 
Our purpose is not to defend what we believe to be a very familiar regime, but 
to describe it and to draw out its implications for enforcement of judgments. 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, attempts to minimize the 
role of territorial thinking have been inspired by frustration with formal modes 
of legal analysis, . belief in social progress, and cosmopolitan impulses. Yet 
territorialism proved to be more resilient than many evidently expected and 
still remains a cornerstone of legal ordering. Consider International Shoe, 
sometimes interpreted as a case replacing territorialism with a ~~functional 
approach"59 International Shoe did away with the requirement that a defen-
dant be present within the territory of the adjudicating state at the time liti-
gation commences, but its alternative requirement-that the defendant have 
minimum contacts with the state-is still an essentially territorial principle. 
A defendant must interact or have interacted with the state in some fash-
ion, typically by having been present or causing something to enter or occur 
within the territory of the state in the course of the events giving rise to the suit. 
Territory defines both the state as an entity and the scope of the interests that 
support its coercive actions. The Supreme Court subsequently made this clear 
by emphasizing, as it had in International Shoe, that the Due Process Clause 
~~does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam 
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no con-
tacts, ties, or relations."60 
And even when the defendant has contacts with the state, it is hard to avoid 
the' conclusion that some are more salient in the mind and more significant 
in the law than others. The many decisions elaborating on the standards of 
59 ARTHUR VON MEHREN AND DONALD TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 651 (1965). 
6o 326 U.S. at 319; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
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International Shoe make this clear. Thus the movement of the defendant's cus-
tomer or the defendant's product into the forum state does not, by itself, pro-
vide a constitutionally sufficient contact to justify the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction. 61 On matters of enforcement, one state cannot send its officers 
into another with authority to enforce its judgments without the consent 
of the second state. Once they cross state lines, they become no more than 
private citizens within the territory of the second state. It is the place where 
the officer acts, not the ultimate purpose of the officer's actions, that counts. 
Similarly, to take an example from the criminal side, apprehension and extra-
dition by the officers of another state, rather than kidnapping by the officers 
of the forum state, provides the usual basis for acquiring jurisdiction over the 
defendant and bringing him across state lines. 62 
All of this is to say that territorial sovereignty matters a great deal jn litiga-
tion and it matters most when a court exercises its coercive power to enforce 
a judgment. If " [ t ]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," as Holmes 
observed, then execution of judgments is the exercise of physical power itself. 63 
At that point in litigation, the state's monopoly on the use of coercion and 
force becomes most important, excluding both private opposition and the 
interference of other states. For intensely practical reasons-not just as a 
matter of logic or formalism-the domain in which one state enforces judg-
ments must not be allowed to overlap with the domain of another. In theory, 
those domains might not be defined territorially, but for the modern state, they 
almost invariably are. Even in federal systems, in which two levels of govern-
ment exercise power over the same territory, rules of priority and supremacy 
dictate that enforcement efforts remain consistent with one another. State and 
federal courts within the United States, for instance, basically follow the rules 
of state law in enforcing money judgments, and where there are conflicting 
enforcement efforts by state and federal courts, federal law generally gives pri-
ority to the court first asserting power over a res. 64 By a combination of defer-
ence to state law and its own inherent supremacy, federal law yields a single, 
consistent resolution of any questions over enforcement of judgments within 
the territory of the United States. 
The principles that govern enforcement of foreign judgments are part and 
parcel of this system. Start with the requirement that a judgment be domes-
ticated before it can be enforced. Simply put, within a system of territorially 
~1 World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 295-96. 
62 U.S. Const. art. rv, § 2. 
63 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). 
64 Fed. R. Civ. P. 69; Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,412 (1964). 
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defined states, a state has a paramount interest in the operation of law within 
its borders. Viewed in formal terms, one might say-as Justice Story did-that 
one sovereign's judgment cannot itself .have any effect within the territory of 
another; it is foreign law and inapplicable of its own force. Framed in more 
pragmatic terms, a state's interest in its own territory takes precedence over 
the interest of any other state, and it must therefore have the opportunity to 
review legal edicts to be given effect within its boundaries or recognized as 
authority that its officers must obey. 
Similar thinking helps explain the reluctance to punish violations of injunc-
tions issued by other states. 65 Several different arguments support the refusal 
to enforce injunctions, but they all revolve around the need to coerce the defen-
dant by means of a citation for contempt. According to a longstanding maxim, 
equity acts only upon the person of the defendant;66 the issuing court's author-
ity is limited to citations for contempt against the defendant within its own ter-
ritory (even if the defendant's violation of the injunction occurred elsewhere); 
and equitable decrees remain subject to amendment, so that they never 
achieve the degree of finality of money judgments. 67 Even the ALI Proposal, 
which generally supports recognition of foreign injunctions, allows only that 
they 11may be entitled to recognition or enforcement under such procedures 
as the recognizing court deems appropriate."68 Continuing supervision of the 
defendant's compliance with the injunction exacts costs upon the courts of 
F2 that they might not be willing to bear and a citation for contempt can lead 
directly to the exercise of physical coercion against the defendant. Instead of 
a presumption in favor of enforcement of F2, injunctions face the nearly uni-
versal practice of not being enforced at all outside of Fl. Hence statutes like 
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, as its name implies, 
covers only money judgments. 69 · 
A similar reluctance underlies the well-established, ~f often-criticized, 
exceptions to the enforcement of foreign tax, penal, and criminal laws, and to 
recognition of judgments based upon those laws. The closer the adjudication 
65 Bakerv. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,238-40 (1998). 
66 Douglas Laycock, Modem American Remedies: Cases and Materials 275, 819 (4th ed. 
2010) (equitable remedies can be used to coerce defendant within the forum to do acts 
outside it). 
67 !d. at 342-46 (summarizing grounds for modification of injunctions). 
68 ALI Proposal, supra note 45, § 2(a)(ii). 
69 The enforcement of federal injunctions in any federal judicial district under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(1)(b) does constitute a counterexample to this proposition. It instead 
confirms it because each such district is within the territorial limits of the same sovereign. 
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of another state or nation comes to core issues of sovereignty, the less likely it is 
to receive enforcement or recognition elsewhere, not only because reflexively 
enforcing the acts of another government threatens to reduce the sovereign 
independence of the enforcer, but also because it may appear as a usurpation 
of the sovereign prerogatives of the government whose act is to be enforced by 
another.70 These hard-and-fast restrictions on the effect of foreign judgments 
reveal in their stark terms the rationale that underlies the other, open-ended 
exceptions to recognition: nations remain reluctant to concede the essential 
·attributes of sovereignty for fear that they might be lost forever. Case-by-case 
re-examination of foreign judgments protects against the loss of sovereignty 
by attrition. 
Rules restricting jurisdiction over property coincide with and reinforce the 
territorial limits on enforcement of judgments, partly because of the special 
importance of property in the context of recovering money damages, but also 
because of the multifaceted way in which authority over property relates to 
jurisdiction. There are really three separate justifications for the long-standing 
doctrinal proposition that a state cannot affect title to property situated else-
where. First, the ability to adjudicate interests in property elsewhere would 
enable Fl to take a large step in the direction of actual enforcement in F2. 
Sooner or later, a plaintiff seeking to recover money damages must identify 
specific assets of the defendant to be liquidated, so that the proceeds may then 
be transferred to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the obligation created by the 
judgment against the defendant. Fl can only declare its judgments as general-
ized, personal obligations, but cannot reduce them to the physical transfer of 
property by the use of force in F2, which would create the risk of outright con-
flict between the officers of two sovereign states. Preserving exclusive jurisdic-
tion over property also preserves each state's monopoly over the use of force. 
The second set of arguments for F2's exclusive authority over property 
rests on the wide array of weighty interests a state has in property situated 
locally. For a territorially defined state, local property is something close to the 
sum total of whatever happens to be within its territory-the contents of 
the territory. The relationship between property and sovereignty is especially 
strong for real property, which resembles territorial sovereignty to the extent it, 
too, is a system for the allocation of physical space.71 Not surprisingly, control 
70 See Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 59, at 793-804, 886-89 (1965) (discussing 
extensions and limitations of refusal to enforce foreign penal laws and judgments). 
71 Indeed the territorial nature of the state itself has been traced by some political theorists 
to property. See A. John Simmons, On the Territorial Rights of States, 11 PHIL. IssuEs 300, 
312-13 (2001). 
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over domestic property has profound practical consequences for states. 
The use of property typically affects the local community, rules governing the 
transfer and scope of property rights affect local markets, and the way owner-
ship of property is held within a given jurisdiction affects both the distribution 
of wealth and the tax base that helps sustain the government. The brevity of 
this description should not obscure the significance of the concerns described, 
which are genuinely fundamental. This is not to say a singular incursion 
in which one state acts on property within another will always jeopardize these 
interests in a serious way, but the overall picture is clear enough: the principle 
of territorially exclusive jurisdiction over property can be justified as a general 
matter in terms of a state's interests as a sovereign and thus in the preservation 
of its sovereignty. 
A distinct and final way in which territorial sovereignty supports non-
recognition of foreign judgments concerning property is the way in which 
this territorial limitation furthers the state's separate interest in maintaining a 
stable and effective system of property law. We refer here not to the state's role 
in protecting against the violation of property rights-protection against tres-
pass, theft, and the like-but to the state's role in titling property, in keeping 
track of who has what claims on which assets. Entitlements within a property 
system are mutually exclusive, in the sense that if Alice owns Blackacre, Bill 
cannot also do so, unless he acquires it from her. This structure presents special 
complexities not faced in other branches of basic private law. To secure prop-
erty in the face of these complications, a government must, at the very least, 
maintain a system of property law offering a reasonably clear set of rules that 
allow title to be determined, and with valuable, mobile, or intangible assets, it 
is frequently necessary either to establish a system to store evidence of title or 
maintain an actual registry that conclusively determines rights in a given asset 
at any point in time. Providing the means to keep track of property rights is a 
vital sovereign function. Indeed, the economist Hernando de Soto lays much 
of the blame for stagnation in the developing world on the failure of govern-
ments there to support formal titling of property; in his account, titling is the 
key to the prosperity of Western economies.72 
Because one person's property rights come at the expense of all other legal 
actors, secure titling depends on exclusive jurisdiction. Having multiple states 
declare title to the same asset threatens serious confusion and uncertainty and, 
indeed, potentially conflicts with the very idea of title itself, in the sense of a 
definitive resolution of mutually exclusive claims. In consequence, observes 
72 See HERNANDO DESOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EvERYWHERE ELSE 10,33 (2000). 
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Benito Arruiiada, 11 [ a Jll kinds of recorders and registries are therefore orga-
nized as territorial public monopolies when they produce evidence or directly 
decide on property rights."73 Arruiiada notes the ubiquity of single title regis-
tries, in contexts ranging from ownership of stock shares to internet domains.74 
The point is that f~H any given asset, one and only source of title can be in 
place. For a system of territorially organized sovereigns charged with oversee-
ing these questions of title, the natural point of departure is the location of the 
asset to be titled. One would not imagine that the deed to a house situated in 
Essex County, Massachusetts, would be found at the courthouse in Okmulgee 
County, Oklahoma. By the same token, judgments operating directly on title 
to the property should not issue from a court in Okmulgee County. In this way, 
sovereignty, territorialism and property are again linked in a way that helps 
account for limitations on the recognition of foreign judgments. 
Finally, we turn to the collection of general exceptions to judgment recogni-
tion discussed in Section 2. Quite apart from the ·considerations supporting 
the specific limitations on judgment enforcement for core sovereign con-
cerns like penal legislation and property titles, a system of territorial sover-
eignty lends support for something like the system of retail-level scrutiny of 
foreign judgments that current law establishes. In particular, the territorial 
basis for enforcement in F2 offers a general check on the abusive exercise of 
jurisdiction-and of decisions on the merits-in Fl. For the same reason, it 
also provides a check on the plaintiff's initial choice of forum whenever the 
plaintiff's property cannot be found there. No matter how likely it is that the 
plaintiff will obtain a judgment in Fl, the plaintiff can recover on the judgment 
only if F2 is willing to enforce it. In either case, territorial limits on enforce-
ment exercise a powerful influence over the plaintiff's choice of forum. 
These territorial limits have theoretical, as well as practical implications. In 
particular, they shed some light on the similarities and differences between 
recognition of judgments in the interstate and international contexts. So long 
as recognition of judgments operates within the boundaries of a single national 
sovereign, as it does in interstate cases, the rule of recognition functions with 
a minimum of judicial discretion. Territoriality defines both the scope of juris-:-
diction for enforcement and the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
National sovereignty supports supervening national law that governs the 
proceedings of courts in component states. That law might be more flexible 
73 Benito Arrur1ada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 401, 
426 (2003). 
7 4 I d.; see also James Y. Stem, Property, Exclusivity, and jurisdiction, 100 VA. L. REV. 111, 175-79 
(2014) (noting importance to status determinations and corporations law). 
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than existing American law, as it is in the European Union, which forbids rec-
ognition of a judgment ~~manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member 
State in which recognition is sought."75 Yet it operates in the same way to limit 
the discretion of the enforcing court to refuse recognition. Comity has little 
place in the internal relations between sister states subject to a single national 
sovereign. To the extent that the European Union approaches the status of a 
single sovereign, its provisions for recognition of judgments become compa-
rably strict. This consequence results from the desirability both of reducing 
friction between member states and imposing a degree of uniformity upon 
proceedings within them. It serves the general purpose of bringing the sepa-
rate states within a federal union into conformity with the requirements of a 
single national sovereign. 
4 Conclusion 
For domestic judgments, it is national law produced by the formation of single 
sovereignty that determines the rules of recognition of judgments, the mini-
mum standards for asserting personal jurisdiction, and the power of a national 
supreme court to assure conformity with those standards. All these rules apply 
of their own force only within the boundaries of the nation state, and each 
reinforces the effectiveness of the other. Rules of personal jurisdiction supply 
the necessary prerequisite for the enforcement of judgments; recognition of 
judgments from other states supports their exercise of personal jurisdiction; 
and review by a supreme court with national jurisdiction enforces both sets 
of standards. The need for internal conformity within a federal union gives 
greater significance to its external boundaries. Judgments rendered outside 
those boundaries can be enforced within it only as a matter of comity or by 
the obligations of a treaty. Enforcement of a foreign judgment has no effect, in 
and of itself, within the boundaries of another sovereign where the property 
or the person of the defendant may be found. In this respect, territoriality is 
inescapable, and will remain so as long as the power of courts depends upon 
the power of the nation state. 
75 Council of the European Union Regulation 44/2001/EC art. 34(1) (on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) 2000 0.]. L. 
012,16/01/2001 P. 
